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speed, and lethality. Hackworth and
England are unsparing in their depictions of the martinets and incompetents
who made up a fair portion of the officer and noncommissioned officers’
corps that led soldiers into the Delta
swamps and rice paddies—beginning
with the battalion commander who
places his unit’s main base in the middle of a Viet Cong minefield, through a
commanding general more focused on
maximizing body counts for his own
career than on effectively fighting an
elusive enemy.
Despite determined opposition both
from the enemy and higher headquarters, Hackworth achieved an organizational transformation of his hard-luck
battalion. The 4/39th became a skilled,
deadly foe of the Viet Cong in the
Delta, a unit that took the fight to the
enemy, taking away his initiative.
Hackworth did this through reimposition of a strict but fair discipline, introduction of and training in proven and
successful fieldcraft, and leadership
from the front. There are no magic bullets or technological fixes for this kind
of transformation, just simple success
on the battlefield—the enemy dies or
goes away. In the beginning of his command, Hackworth’s disciplinarian approach earned him a contract on his
head from his own soldiers. By the time
he left, one of these same soldiers
would write, “The most terrible thing
happened today. Colonel Hackworth
left. You remember the one everyone
hated, and wanted shot? Now there’s
another bounty out for him—to anyone
who can get him back.”
Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts contains the
collected practical wisdom of this successful battalion commander. Curiously, however, the wisdom that keeps
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soldiers alive on the battlefield does not
necessarily contribute to the end of battles or wars. Hackworth and England
acknowledge as much in an account of
a conversation between Hackworth and
John Paul Vann. Hackworth and Vann
were compatriots and friends; Vann
had been Hackworth’s company commander in Korea. Vann, now a civilian
advisor to the South Vietnamese regime, told Hackworth that while his
battalion was improving the security of
the area, they were killing too many civilians. Vann added, “Once the 9th’s
out of here, I reckon that eighty to
ninety percent of the Delta’s population
will come to our side. You guys have
been the VC’s biggest recruiter. You kill
a boy’s mama, which side do you
reckon he’ll join?”
Therein lies the major lesson of this
frank, valuable book. A nation’s armed
forces can be exceptionally well trained,
exceptionally lethal, and full of esprit de
corps. They can win all the battles. They
can maximize the body count. But if the
end of the battle or war is flawed—or
worse, uncertain—no amount of courage, steel, or personal battlefield leadership will have obtained victory.
JON CZARNECKI

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the
CIA and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.
441pp. $27

That the United States has conducted a
program of high-altitude and spaceborne photographic reconnaissance
since the mid-1950s is hardly a secret.
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With the public release of many previously classified source documents and
project histories, the time is right for
Philip Taubman’s history of the strategic issues, politics, personalities, and
technologies that drove the development of America’s extraordinary space
reconnaissance capability.
Taubman has reported on national security and intelligence matters for the New
York Times for more than twenty years.
He is clearly a thorough researcher; his
list of consulted sources, documents,
and technical reports runs to eighteen
pages of small print. Much of it is material new to the public domain.
Strange as it may seem today, when the
United States is rich in strategic intelligence, in the early 1950s it had no reliable estimate of the numbers of
strategic bombers, missiles, or nuclear
warheads in the Soviet Union. As
Winston Churchill said, the USSR was
“a riddle wrapped in an enigma.” Bison
bombers flew circles around Moscow to
inflate the estimates of Western air
attachés of their numbers; Nikita
Khrushchev rattled rockets to add to
the noise.
In this murky but threatening environment, the Eisenhower administration
was struggling to develop a balanced
defense policy, one that would offer effective defense against an opponent
whose capabilities and intentions were
imperfectly known, but one that would
not break the nation’s economy. Hard
strategic intelligence—reconnaissancebased counts of strategic things—was
key. However, the Soviet Union was
then what was picturesquely called “a
denied area.” RB-47s and similar aircraft probed the borders but could not
see deeply into the Soviet Union, and
their reconnaissance flights often ended
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in political embarrassment for the government and tragedy for the crews.
At this point, a collection of remarkable
men entered the game: Edwin Land of
Polaroid, a politically well connected
systems engineer; Kelly Johnson, head
of Lockheed’s fabled “Skunk Works”
and builder of extraordinary aircraft;
James Baker of Harvard, a most creative
camera-system designer; and Arthur
Lundhal of the CIA, a gifted photographic interpreter. Richard Bissell, the
CIA’s legendary manager of high-risk
projects, assumed the leadership of this
gang and with it brought the fabled U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
and later the first photographic reconnaissance satellites, Corona, to operational fulfillment.
Taubman paints these men unreservedly as patriots, putting their considerable technical skills and imagination at
their country’s service. That they were.
More importantly, they grasped the
need for hard strategic intelligence and
had the perspective to see the promise
of new technologies and their application to the problem of strategic
reconnaissance.
The author does a splendid job of interpreting the significance of the technical
problems encountered and the brilliant
ingenuity of the solutions. Aircraft had
never operated at the combination of
altitude (over seventy thousand feet)
and range (beyond three thousand
miles) that strategic overflight of the
Soviet Union would require. The solution from Johnson’s Skunk Works was
the U-2, a sort of jet-powered glider
with the climb characteristics of a
homesick angel. Baker designed cameras with long focal lengths that folded
into tight fuselage and satellite spaces;
Kodak developed films that could
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survive the temperature extremes encountered at reconnaissance altitudes;
Lundhal organized a photographic
interpretation activity to receive and
analyze the pictures.
When satellite-borne cameras replaced
the U-2, new and even more demanding technical problems arose. Just getting a satellite launched and into orbit
was no mean trick. Choosing between
relaying television pictures from space
or returning exposed film was a subtle
and demanding technical choice. Recovery of the exposed film was selected
and became the coolest trick of all: film
capsules, ejected from the satellite, reentered the atmosphere and parachuted
down to where a specially equipped
C-130 snagged them out of the air.
All this seems quite ordinary today, but
in the 1950s these were innovative
technical accomplishments. Too often
strategic histories treat critical technical
accomplishments lightly and gloss over
their significance to strategic and policy
choices. To Taubman’s credit, he is attuned to the importance of the enabling
technologies and brings their role and
impact to the reader’s understanding.
After getting the cameras aloft,
Taubman turns his attention to the
consequences of the pictures they returned. The first flights captured staggering numbers of detailed pictures
covering vast sweeps of the hidden interior of the Soviet Union. The pictures
revealed that Soviet Bison bombers
were as rare as the animal is today in
Montana and that Soviet intercontinental missiles, while large and ugly, were
few and in a low state of readiness.
This did not end the Cold War or put
America completely at ease, but it did
bring some balance and scope to
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defense planning for the late 1950s. In
1960 a presidential candidate who
should be remembered for better things
rode to victory partly on claims that the
Eisenhower administration had allowed
a dangerous missile gap to grow. The
pictures from these satellites and aircraft put paid to that.
Taubman’s book is twice valuable—
first, for its historical development of
the value and impact of strategic intelligence, and second, for its insight into
the role of technology and technologists
in shaping strategic policy.
In his final pages, Taubman raises important questions about America’s current reliance on technical intelligence
collection methods. He notes that little
about al-Qa‘ida’s activities or capabilities is being revealed or forecast by satellite reconnaissance and that human
intelligence sources and the collection
of intelligence must play a central role
in the twenty-first-century war against
terrorism.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE

Edgartown, Massachusetts

Bonds, John Bledsoe. Bipartisan Strategy: Selling
the Marshall Plan. Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
2002. 256pp. $64.95

When we look back on great historical
events, we often ascribe an inevitability
to things that were, in fact, anything but.
In this lucid and comprehensive study of
the formulation and enactment of the
Marshall Plan, John Bonds recounts how
this great pillar of American post–World
War II policy was anything but inevitable. Bonds, a retired captain of the U.S.
Navy and professor of history at the
Citadel in Charlestown, South Carolina,
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